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United Nations: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in Cambodia

[Part 2 of 4]



A. Preparations for elections and freedom of expression

32. In a comment of 18 November 1997 on the General Assembly report, the Royal Government gave information about progress made in creating the necessary legal framework to hold elections. At that time the law on political parties had been adopted by the National Assembly and the election law was being debated. The latter law was adopted in late December 1997. Since then the National Electoral Committee has been established and its members confirmed by the National Assembly. Presently, a proposed law for the creation of the Constitutional Council has been submitted to the National Assembly but not yet approved. The Constitutional Council will be important in the electoral process in relation to disputes.

33. The discussions in the National Assembly on the law on political parties and the election law resulted in several positive amendments to the drafts prepared by the Council of Ministers. However, some provisions may still be problematic. An applicant political party would need 4,000 signed-up members in order to be registered, which may be perceived as a violation of the constitutional right to form a party. This particular requirement has been made more demanding by a Ministry of Interior instruction that some additional data such as their professions must be given about the 4,000 members.

34. The law on political parties, furthermore, seems insufficiently clear about what activities can be undertaken by parties which have applied for registration but have not yet been formally cleared. Although instructions were given in February 1998 by the Ministry of Interior to territorial authorities and to police to protect political parties, those instructions were limited to parties which have already registered and been recognized. A political party in the process of registering is allowed under the Constitution and the law on political parties to campaign, display signboards and organize rallies in order to recruit members. Political parties must also be free to distribute membership cards as they need to mention the serial number of the membership cards on the list of 4,000 signatures to complete the submission for registration.

35. Competing factions of split parties claim the right to use the original party name and logo. The Ministry of Interior has taken the view that such disputes must be resolved in court, though others have argued that such issues could be brought to the Constitutional Council. The combination of the need to register a party and the lack of clarity in some cases about which group can use established party names and how such disputes should be resolved has caused understandable confusion among some political groupings.

36. The National Electoral Committee is important for the protection of the freedom and fairness of the election: it must therefore be genuinely independent. Under the election law, the NEC has the following membership: President, Vice-President, two citizen representatives, one representative of each of the four political parties having a seat in the National Assembly, two high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Interior and one NGO representative. Unfortunately, appointments were not decided upon in an atmosphere of consensus. The impartiality of the NEC has been questioned following allegations of unfair methods in the election of the NGO representative and partisan nominations for the party representatives of FUNCINPEC and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BDLP). The National Assembly approved the composition of the NEC without any discussion on the complaints submitted by the two main NGO election monitoring coalitions, a student group, the Secretary-General of FUNCINPEC and a member of parliament of the Son Sann faction of the BDLP.

37. The Special Representative welcomes the fact that the NEC will operate as a permanent body, which may enhance its independent status. As for the provincial and communal electoral committees, he recommends that the NEC specify in the regulations the participation of each group - citizens, civil servants and local in order to avoid unbalanced and politically biased committees.

38. Concern has also been expressed to the Special Representative about the rules for ballot counting. According to the election law the ballots will be counted on the site of the polling station which may make voters fear that the true confidentiality of the ballot is not guaranteed. The Special Representative recommends action to address this problem.

39. A particular concern relates to the provision in the election law that non-rehabilitated convicted prisoners could not stand as candidates. The concept of rehabilitation is not clearly defined in this context. For instance, different opinions have been expressed on whether a royal amnesty is a form of rehabilitation. Moreover, persons in prison, including in pre-trial detention, cannot register as voters and will therefore be barred from running as candidates as well. These regulations and their lack of clarity may be misused in order to prevent certain politicians from taking part in the election.

40. A major problem is related to the possibility for exiled politicians to take part in the 1998 elections. The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) through its procedures has stated its concern about the treatment of members of the National Assembly. H.E.Mr.Ung Huot and H.E.Hun Sen wrote to the Secretary-General in October 1997, expressing the Government's desire to see the return to Cambodia of politicians who had fled abroad in the tensions surrounding the fighting of early July 1997. The letter stated that the Government would undertake to guarantee the physical security and safety of those members of the National Assembly and other political leaders who wish to return to Cambodia and resume their political activities in connection with the forthcoming elections... to maintain and respect the parliamentary immunity of members of the National Assembly, and to guarantee all other political leaders freedom from arrest and detention in respect of acts done and words spoken prior to their return, and thereafter in respect of acts [done] and words spoken in connection with their electoral activities.

41. The letter further stated that the Government would ensure that all political leaders enjoy freedom from intimidation and threat in respect of any and all political activities relating to the election and, in particular, freedom of movement, assembly and speech as provided for under the Constitution and the electoral law, without discrimination. The Secretary-General welcomed this initiative and accepted the suggestion that the United Nations, through the office of the Representative of the Secretary-General, should monitor the Government's fulfilment of these guarantees.

42. Accordingly, at the end of November 1997, four United Nations monitors were sent to Cambodia to work with the office of the Representative of the Secretary-General and other United Nations offices in monitoring the return of Cambodian politicians. As a parallel move, the Royal Government of Cambodia established a security committee of senior police officials to ensure the safety of all returnees and to liaise with the monitors in the course of their duties. Cooperation between the United Nations and this committee has to date been exemplary.

43. In its resolution 52/135 on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, the General Assembly expressed support for the role of United Nations offices in monitoring the return of political leaders currently outside the country and their unfettered resumption of political activity. The activities of the monitors have so far centred on the activities of several Technical Advance Teams which have been sent by the Union of Cambodian Democrats to Cambodia to assess the political climate in advance of a decision as to whether or not a permanent return should be made. In addition, they have also monitored the activities of the President of the Khmer Nation Party, Mr. Sam Rainsy, and the President of the Cambodian National Sustaining Party, Mr.Pen Sovann. In late January 1998, four members of Parliament also returned. The monitors have further made several assessment missions to the provinces of Kompong Thom, Kompong Cham, Battambang, Siem Reap, Kampot, Takeo, Kompong Speu, Kompong Chhnang, Prey Veng and Svay Rieng.

44. To date, the Monitoring Operation can conclude that the Government has fulfilled its guarantees with regard to the returning politicians themselves. However, it is important to note that the ability of these politicians to resume their political activities depends upon the possibility of their supporters to function. In this regard, the monitors have noted that the supporters of many returning politicians remain reticent and fearful of the future and that there is minimal activity in the provinces by those parties in opposition to those in the Royal Government.

45. In the past months, the Special Representative was informed of incidents in several provinces of intimidation and pressure from CPP officials, aimed primarily at members of FUNCINPEC, but also at members of other parties. In Kampong Cham, thumbprint and signature campaigns have been reported, with village and commune chiefs required to collect signatures from villagers committing themselves to the CPP. Methods employed have included promises of reward as well as intimidation and threats. One group of four families in that province reported that ever since they refused to sign, claiming to be affiliated with no party, their houses have been under constant surveillance.

46. Numerous reports have been received of pressure being applied to individuals in positions of authority aligned with FUNCINPEC. The Special Representative has received accounts of marginalization at work, where police officers and local government officials have been pushed out of the normal decision-making process. In other reported cases there has been repeated pressure to switch political allegiances, applied by superiors in a work hierarchy, thus bringing with it the threat of demotion or dismissal. There have also been reports of physical intimidation of known FUNCINPEC members, some of whom were beaten up, arrested, or had their properties surrounded and looted on the grounds that they might be hiding weapons. Such reports have come mostly from Kampong Cham and Siem Reap provinces.

47. The Special Representative notes with concern that political party signboards other than those belonging to the CPP and parties allied to it have been largely removed throughout the country. In some cases, FUNCINPEC signs bearing the logo, bearing Prince Ranariddh's portrait, have been replaced by logos of Toan Chhay's faction of the party bearing an image of the Independence Monument; KNP signboards of Sam Rainsy's faction and BLDP signs of the Son Sann faction have disappeared. Varying degrees of intimidation have been reported, including signboards being burnt and shot at. In other instances, FUNCINPEC and KNP members have simply been instructed by CPP officials to take down their signboards. In other cases they have removed the signboards themselves to avoid intimidation. The scale of attacks on signboards and pressure to alter political affiliations has varied from province to province. Reports indicate that in Kampong Thom and Kampong Chhnang, signboards and flags bearing Prince Ranariddh's portrait have been publicly displayed since late November 1997.

48. Even in the provinces where FUNCINPEC offices remain open, little or no political activity in the form of canvassing, campaigning or recruiting is actually taking place. It is reported that FUNCINPEC-appointed candidates are not involved in any political activity, fearing for their security. Police in several provinces have reportedly announced that the KNP is an illegal party, and that those associating themselves with it will be endangering themselves. The Special Representative was also informed that in Kandal, KNP membership cards were confiscated from several party members in house-to-house visits by the police. Due to security threats, the KNP has delayed the opening of its offices in the provinces, while waiting for written notification from the Ministry of Interior stating that it is a registered party.

49. There have been at least two instances, in Svay Rieng and in Kampong Cham, of FUNCINPEC members being pressed or intimidated into joining Toan Chhay's FUNCINPEC faction. In January 1998, the KNP also reported ongoing opposition from the Kong Mony faction, as the latter forcibly took down signboards in Kompong Speu and Battambang.

50. Student leaders affiliated or supposedly affiliated with the FUNCINPEC or the KNP have fled or are still in hiding, after reportedly having been harassed and intimidated. Since the death of the President of the FUNCINPEC Youth Association, Chhuong Meas Panharith, who was shot dead in October 1997 after having received threats, the organization has halted its activities. Some other youth organizations affiliated with FUNCINPEC and the KNP are keeping a low profile, also for security reasons. The Special Representative was informed that the FUNCINPEC affiliated student organizations in the universities had been subjected to pressure and intimidation, and thus were no longer able to operate.

51. Equal access to the media is essential for free, fair and credible elections. Since early July 1997, FUNCINPEC has had no equal access to a radio or television station; the KNP and the BLDP (Son Sann faction) have also not had access. The Special Representative raised these problems with the Secretary of State at the Ministry of Information, H.E.Mr.Khieu Khanarith, in January 1998. The response was that all registered parties would have equal access to the State radio and television stations and that FUNCINPEC would, through its affiliated company, be able to reopen its previous radio and television broadcasting. The radio equipment confiscated in July 1997 would be returned. While welcoming these promises, the Special Representative concluded in late January 1998 that the overall media situation had to be improved in order to encourage an open debate and free dissemination of opinions.

52. With regard to freedom of the media in general, the Special Representative recognizes a recent trend to restrict the free flow of information in Cambodia. Threats against editors, suspension of opposition newspapers and requests for apologies put concrete limits on freedom of the media. The fact that some newspapers are of low quality is no excuse. If this trend continues, the degree of freedom of the media required for free, fair and credible election will not be sufficient.

53. In October 1997, a programme called Programmes and Solutions on State-run television was cancelled. This programme, which had been on the air since 1995, dealt with current issues in Cambodia. Earlier in the same month, Dr.Lao Mong Hay, the host of this programme and President of the non-governmental Khmer Institute for Democracy, attended a symposium in Bangkok and spoke of problems in Cambodia, including the executions in July-August 1997. After returning, Dr.Lao Mong Hay learned that the Ministry of Information had discontinued his programme.

54. There are now more than 40 newspapers in Cambodia, of which approximately 11 are opposition newspapers compared with approximately 19 before July 1997. The circulation of the opposition papers is low and limited to Phnom Penh and a few provincial towns. Since July 1997, several editors of opposition newspapers who remained in Cambodia or returned have been threatened. The Special Representative is also aware of an incident involving a pro-CPP paper. Two grenades were thrown at the office of Koh Santepheap (Island of Peace) newspaper on 15 October 1997. No one was injured and a clear motive has not been established.

55. On 13 October 1997, Antarakum (Intervention News) newspaper was suspended for 25 days by the Ministry of Information. The suspension was due to photomontages of Prince Ranariddh and General Nhek Bun Chay and to stories critical of Hun Sen. The suspension was lifted after seven days when the Ministry of Information demanded an apology, which Antarakum provided. Another suspension occurred of an opposition newspaper called Neak Proyuth (The Combatant) on 7 November 1997. The reasons given were an article which accused Hun Sen of being pushed by Viet Nam to cause a big war and that individuals running the paper had not identified themselves clearly. Neak Proyuth was asked to write a letter of apology to the Ministry of Information, which it did. It was allowed to begin printing again after it submitted a biography of the individuals running the paper to the Ministry of Information. On 8 January 1998, six opposition newspapers were suspended by the Government because of the content of certain articles which spoke critically and negatively of Hun Sen and the Government. The suspension was lifted a week later by Hun Sen when meeting with European Union officials.

56. In December 1997, the Ministry of Information issued a new instruction requiring the media to cite two government sources when reporting on issues relating to national security and political stability. A subdecree has been drafted under the press law on the same issue. The substance of the subdecree will be of critical importance. The concepts of national security and political stability defined in it could be abused in order to restrict freedom of the media, thereby contravening the Constitution and international standards. During the debate on the press law in 1995 the National Assembly declined to grant the Ministry of Information the authority to issue a ministerial proclamation on press identification. In spite of this, a proclamation has been drafted adding educational, health, financial and administrative requirements which go beyond the provisions of the press law. Khieu Khanarith, however, promised the Special Representative in January 1998 that there would be further consultations on these regulations with media and human rights representatives before decisions were taken.

57. In conclusion, the Special Representative urges the National Assembly to adopt legislation for the establishment of the Constitutional Council. The composition of the Constitutional Council should be decided upon without delay so that it can start functioning soon. It has to review the law on political parties and the election law and prepare its role in connection with complaints in the registration process of political parties and in the electoral process. The independence of the National Electoral Committee should be protected and electoral committees on lower levels appointed in an impartial spirit. Political parties should be given free and equal access to the media. Swift and fair decisions should be taken on the disputes between factions on party names and logos. All politicians in exile should be free to come back in safety and take full part in the election campaign; this includes H.R.H.Prince Ranariddh. Decisive steps should be taken to address the phenomenon of impunity in political crimes; investigations and prosecutions should be seriously pursued in the case of last year's 30 March grenade attack and July-August executions. Effective measures should be taken to put an end to local intimidation against party activists. All these aspects require further monitoring.

B. Protection against political violence

58. The lack of investigation into politically-motivated acts of violence is one important aspect of the problem of impunity in Cambodia. Much political violence marred the developments before the elections and the formation of the new Government in 1993. During that period 667 persons were reportedly killed or abducted and disappeared. Scores of others were injured, threatened and intimidated. Political violence began to reappear in 1994 when in March a newspaper was targeted in a grenade attack. In July 1994, there were allegations about a coup attempt and in September 1994 journalist Noun Chan was murdered. This political murder was never investigated and its perpetrators are still free. It was followed by the murder of a second journalist, Sao Chandara, in December 1994. The reported perpetrator was this time arrested but released after a clearly unsatisfactory trial. Several warrants of arrest have since been issued for this person, but he is still free and has, in fact, been promoted. In addition, two more journalists have been murdered, three others escaped attempts on their life, two opposition newspapers have been ransacked and their staff beaten, three others were attacked with grenades, a government TV station was attacked with B-40 rockets and machine gun fire, two political rallies were attacked with grenades. These acts have not been seriously investigated, no one has been brought to justice.

59. During his sixth and seventh missions, the Special Representative continued to assess the extent to which the pledges to investigate instances of political violence were being implemented. He met the Director of the National Police on 4 December 1997 in order to discuss the investigation into the 30 March 1997 grenade attack in which at least 16 persons were killed and more than 100 were injured. No one has been arrested or prosecuted for this crime. The investigation has made no progress since June 1997 but is not closed.

60. Gen. Hok Lundi told the Special Representative that a dozen witnesses had been heard by the government Commission of Inquiry and that two of them had provided sufficient detail to permit composite images of three suspects to be drawn with the assistance of expertise from the FBI. The publication of these sketches led to the identification of one suspect. However, according to Gen. Hok Lundi, the suspect sought protection from Gen. Nhek Bun Chay who had refused to hand him over to the Government. Another difficulty in the investigation was that the KNP leader Sam Rainsy, who was present and obviously targeted during the grenade attack, had not wanted to testify before the government Commission.

61. As an American citizen had been injured, the FBI sent a team to investigate that particular aspect and later were invited to assist the government investigation. The team members, however, left after they were told that their security could not be guaranteed. Gen.Hok Lundi told the Special Representative in December 1997 that cooperation with the FBI should be sought again. At the time of writing this report, the Special Representative is not aware of such an invitation being issued.

62. On 21 August 1997 the Special Representative submitted a memorandum to the Royal Government presenting evidence of summary executions, torture and missing persons since July. The documentation included information on at least 41cases of execution after arrest. In a meeting on 3 September 1997 with the Special Representative, the Second Prime Minister requested him to convey to the Secretary-General of the United Nations his assurance that all instances of summary executions described in the memorandum would be thoroughly investigated and that no perpetrator would be spared. The Special Representative welcomed the statement in his report to the General Assembly (see A/52/489).

63. During the sixth visit of the Special Representative, it became apparent that no serious steps had been taken to start investigating the executions reported in the memorandum, not even in the case of former Secretary of State Gen.Ho Sok. In fact, the Special Representative was informed that an investigation initiated by the co-Ministers of Interior into that particular case had been stopped. The Minister of Justice informed the Cambodia office that he had received no instruction from the Council of Ministers to convene an interministerial committee to investigate the executions. On 10 December 1997, the Special Representative wrote to the Second Prime Minister about the lack of investigation into the executions and encouraged him to intervene so that the process could effectively start. By the end of December 1997, there was no indication from the Royal Government about such steps.

64. When the Special Representative paid his seventh visit, it became clear that the Government's efforts had focused on attempts to discover mistakes in the memorandum in order, as it appeared, to discredit its findings rather than to initiate an effective investigation into the executions themselves. On 23 January 1998, the Second Prime Minister presented to the High Commissioner for Human Rights and, following the meeting with her, to the media, four persons whom he identified as being listed as killed in the memorandum. These men were introduced as Ang Borith, Chin Vannak, So Lay Sak and Chao Keang. The claim that four individuals named as killed by the Special Representative in fact were alive was reiterated in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 27 January 1998.

65. In a subsequent statement, the Special Representative clarified the status of the four men. Ang Borith was not mentioned anywhere in the memorandum. The names of Major So Lay Sak and Major Chin Vannak appear in the memorandum in a chapter concerning "missing persons." The fact that these two men reappeared, together with Ung Sim, who was also listed as missing, was welcomed by the Special Representative. Regarding the fourth name, Chao Keang, there was a mistake: he had been mistaken in the memorandum for Chao Kong, his younger brother who, together with another brother, Cha Tea, had been executed on 6/7 July 1997.

66. In his statement, the Special Representative regretted that Chao Keang was presented to the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the media as proof that the memorandum was false, while two of his brothers had been killed and no one had been brought to justice for their murders. The Special Representative concluded that the figure of at least 41summary executions, as mentioned in the memorandum, was still valid and he regretted that no serious effort had been made to investigate these killings and prepare prosecutions. The High Commissioner and the Special Representative offered to attempt to locate international experts who could come and observe and advise, if requested, any investigation and the preparation of prosecutions in regard to the executions.

67. Since the Special Representative submitted the memorandum on 21 August 1997, he has received information relating to the killings of 21 other officers, officials or activists affiliated with FUNCINPEC. These allegations are now being checked for accuracy and clarification of circumstances. The Special Representative is also seeking further information about the killing of On Phuong, an activist of the Khmer Nation Party, and his five-yearold daughter in the province of Prey Veng on 27 January 1998.

68. In his previous reports the Special Representative has documented the nature and extent of the problem of impunity in Cambodia. He has underlined that this has been a long-standing problem and a major obstacle in the efforts to construct a functioning system of the rule of law. He has noted that impunity undermines faith in the administration of justice and the moral authority of the courts. The problem is both institutional and political, and therefore requires not only reforms in the administration of justice, but also the political will to ensure that no one is above the law, that the judiciary is given effective authority to prosecute all offenders, regardless of their status or rank, and that it is allowed to discharge its duties in an independent manner.

69. The Special Representative regrets that insufficient action has been taken to address this major problem. The Second Prime Minister took action in August ;1997 against illegal checkpoints along the roads. There have also been efforts to seize illegal weapons, as pointed out in the Government's letter of 18 November 1997 to the Special Representative. However, soldiers, the police and the military police continue to intimidate civilians; such reports have reached the Special Representative from several provinces.

70. The Special Representative commends the efforts made by the Minister of Justice to eradicate institutionalized impunity as guaranteed by article 51 of the 1994 Law on Civil Servants. In January 1997 the Minister of Justice submitted a draft law amending article 51 to the co-Prime Ministers, suggesting that the need to seek authorization to prosecute from the Council of Ministers or the head of the concerned institution prior to the prosecution or arrest of a civil servant, except in cases of "flagrante delicto", would be replaced by a mechanism in which the prosecutor wishing to charge a civil servant and bring him to trial would merely inform the person's superior. In his comment of 11 November 1997 on the General Assembly report, the Minister urged the Council of Ministers again to consider this amendment. However, article 51 has not been amended or repealed. The Minister of Justice, in another development, informed the Minister of Defence on 22 June 1997 in writing that article 51 was not applicable to military personnel. Though the letter made reference to a particular case involving a member of the military police arrested in April 1997, the letter appears to clarify the scope of article 51 in general.

71. The most serious human rights violations in Cambodia in recent history have been committed by members of the Khmer Rouge. When the country was known as Democratic Kampuchea, the official name of the Khmer Rouge State from 1975 to 1979, an estimated 1.7 million people were killed, or died from disease, forced labour and hunger. The Khmer Rouge was responsible for widespread atrocities, including massacres, executions of civilians and foreign nationals, and torture which continued even after 1979.

72. No Khmer Rouge leader has been arrested or prosecuted by the Cambodian authorities. None of them has ever admitted guilt or even apologized to the Cambodian people for his or her actions. The Special Representative is concerned at the prospect of current and former Khmer Rouge leaders being allowed to participate in the political process without their personal responsibility for the 1975-1979 killings being clarified. Without accountability of the Khmer Rouge leaders, the cycle of impunity in Cambodia will continue. Making the Khmer Rouge leaders against whom there is evidence of widespread abuses answerable before the courts may restore some public confidence in official justice. The show trial against Pol Pot in Anlong Veng in June 1997 reinforces the need for a genuine legal process in full conformity with international standards for fair trial procedures.

73. In resolution 1997/49 the Commission on Human Rights requested the Secretary-General through his Special Representative for human rights in Cambodia, in collaboration with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, to examine any request by Cambodia for assistance in responding to past serious violations of Cambodian and international law as a means of bringing about national reconciliation, strengthening democracy and addressing the issue of individual accountability. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 21 June 1997 the Cambodian co-Prime Ministers requested the assistance of the United Nations and the international community in bringing to justice those persons responsible for the genocide and/or crimes against humanity during the rule of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979.

74. In their letter, the co-Prime Ministers stated that Cambodia did not have the resources or expertise to conduct a procedure of that scope. Thus, they believed it was necessary to ask for the assistance of the United Nations. They stated that they were aware of similar efforts to respond to the genocide and crimes against humanity in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and requested that similar assistance be given to Cambodia. The co-Prime Ministers stated in their letter that they believed that crimes of this magnitude were of concern to all persons in the world, as they greatly diminished respect for the most basic human right, the right to life. They expressed the hope that the international community could assist the Cambodian people in establishing the truth about the period 1975-1979 and in bringing to justice those responsible. Only in that way could the tragedy be brought to a full and final conclusion.

75. In the General Assembly report the Special Representative strongly urged the United Nations and its Member States to respond positively and generously to the above mentioned request. To address the problem of impunity, it is important that the most serious violators of human rights in Cambodia are brought to justice under international law. As an immediate first step, the Special Representative recommended to the General Assembly that the Secretary General be authorized to appoint experts to evaluate the existing evidence of responsibility for the Khmer Rouge human rights violations. The Special Representative raised this issue again in September 1997 with each of the two signatories of the 21 June 1997 letter, as well as with the King. All three declared their support for the proposal.

76. The lack of prosecution by the Government of past instances of serious human rights violations creates a climate of impunity and sends a negative signal to everyone in the society. To the criminal elements, it is an encouragement that they might continue to kill, torture, rape, illegally arrest and detain without being held accountable; that they are above the law. To the public, the message might be understood to be that the law is powerless to protect ordinary people from abuse and that, therefore, it is necessary to defend one's interests through violent means.

[This section of the document, "Issues of Special Concern," is continued in the next segment. Click here to continue.]

Copyright 1998
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Geneva, Switzerland


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